

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 070496  
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S E C R E T STATE 070496

EXDIS MILITARY ADDEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

FOLLOWING REPEAT KHARTOUM 1053 ACTION SECSTATE  
INFO ADDIS CAIRO DAMASCUS JIDDA LONDON MOGADISCIO MOSCOW  
NAIROBI PARIS PEKING ADANA 30 MAR 77

QUOTE

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 1035

EXDIS/NOFORN

DEPT PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY AND USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR SU US  
SUBJECT: RED SEA SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR USG POLICY

REF: KHARTOUM 0996 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY. SUCCESSFUL SUDANESE INITIATIVE RE RED SEA SECURITY  
CONFERENCE HAS DEEP HISTORIC ROOTS, INCLUDING STRESS ON MOSLEM  
AND ARAB CHARACTER NUMBER EAST AFRICAN STATES. IT APPARENTLY  
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GREW OUT OF INITIAL SAG/GOS UNDERSTANDING YEAR AGO THAT  
JOINT EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE WOO PDRY AWAY FROM SOVIETS BUT  
HAS BEEN BROADENED DUE INCREASING FLUIDITY OF DEVELOPMENTS  
IN HORN. SAUDIS, SUDANESE AND SOMALIS MAY BE EXPECTED USE  
THIS RUBRIC TO COVER INCREASED SUPPORT TO ERITREAN GUERRILLAS  
IN EFFORT ESTABLISH MOSLEM ERITREAN STATE, THUS SEALING OFF  
PRO-SOVIET ADDIS REGIME FROM ACCESS TO RED SEA. WHEN IN  
WASHINGTON WEEK APRIL 4, FONMIN KHALID WILL NO DOUBT TOUT  
RED SEA INITIATIVE AS MAJOR ANTI-SOVIET DEVELOPMENT MERITING  
SPECIAL USG SUPPORT, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN FEW CONCRETE DEVEL-

OPMENTS SO FAR AND VARIETY SPECIAL INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED. ANY SUCH APPROACH SHOULD THUS BE TREATED WITH GREAT RESERVE. GOS IN FACT WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS ANYWAY FOR ITS OWN REASONS (INCLUDING MAXIMIZATION SAG FINANCIAL AID) AND SPECIAL USG SUPPORT COULD FURTHER POLARIZE HORN SITUATION. HOWEVER, TEMPO RESUMPTION OUR BILATERAL AID PROGRAM AND OTHER MEASURES TO CONSOLIDATE USG/GOS TIES SHOULD BE STEPPED UP. END SUMMARY.

1. NIMEIRI'S SUCCESS IN BRINGIN TOGETHER AT TAIZ 'SUMMIT' LEADERS ALL ARAB LEAGUE STATES BORDERING RED SEA EXCEPT EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA (WHO CLEARLY SUPPORTED HIS INITIATIVE) IS ONLY LATEST DEVELOPMENT IN RAPIDLY EVOLVING SITUATION IN HORN/RED SEA AREA WITH CLEAR IMPLICATIONS FOR USG POLICY. IN LIGHT POLITICAL REVIEW NOW UNDER WAY WASHINGTON, AND FACT PERIPATETIC SUDANESE FONMIN KHALID (WHO NO DOUBT INSPIRATION BEHIND RECENT SUDANESE MOVES) SCHEDULED ARRIVE THERE APRIL 4 FOR TALKS WITH SENIOR USG OFFICIALS, FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OVER-ALL SITUATION AS IT APPEARS FROM KHARTOUM MAY BE HELPFUL.

2. WHILE GOS HAS TO EXTENT REACTED TO DEVELOPMENTS HERE AND IN ETHIOPIA SINCE LAST JULY'S ABORTIVE LIBYAN-BACKED COUP KHARTOUM, FACT IS SUDANESE AND OTHER MODERATE ARAB POLICIES THIS REGION HAVE DEEP HISTORIC ROOTS. WHEN ETHIOPIAN COUP FIRST OCCURRED, NIMEIRI TOLD ME HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO  
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ADVENT REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN ADDIS BUT WOULD BE MOST CONCERNED IF QUOTE FOREIGN HAND UNQUOTE APPEARED TO HAVE GAINED SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE. NIMEIRI INFORMED EX-DEPSECDEF CLEMENTS AND ME IN WASHINGTON LAST JUNE THAT HE WAS WORKING WITH SAG (HE CLAIMED QUOTE PERSONALLY UNQUOTE WITH FAHD AND SULTAN) AND EGYPTIANS ON PROJECT TO WOO PDRY AWAY FROM RUSSIANS. IF QUOTE CERTAIN THINGS HAPPEN UNQUOTE, NIMEIRI ASSERTED SAG PREPARED OFFER PDRY \$400 MILLION IN AID.

3. FOCUS NIMEIRI'S ENDEAVORS WAS OBVIOUSLY BROADENED FOLLOWING ABORTIVE COUP, LATER REPORTS LIBYAN/EPMG COOPERATION, INCREASING EPMG/SOVIET CONTACTS AND INDICATION FROM SOMALI PRESIDENT SIAD LAST DECEMBER (KHARTOUM 0119, NOTAL) OF HIS CONCERN RE HEIGHTENED RUSSIAN ACTIVITY IN ADDIS. NIMEIRI'S ACHIEVEMENT IN INDUCING SIAD AND PDRY'S ROBAYA ALI TO MEET WITH NORTH YEMEN'S HAMDY AND HIMSELF HOWEVER, NOT SO MUCH TRIBUTE TO SPECIAL QUALITIES SUDANESE DIPLOMACY AS IT IS TO MOUNTING INTEREST IN MOGADISCIO AND ADEN FOR ACCESS TO SAUDI FINANCIAL HELP, NOW THAT FOCUS USSR ATTENTION IN HORN SHIFTING ELSEWHERE. NIMEIRI'S FUNCTION HAS BEEN LIMITED TO TRADITIONAL ROLE OF ARAB MIDDLEMAN, IN WHICH HE APPEARS HAVE SCORED SOME SUCCESS DESPITE HASTY AND SOMEWHAT CHAOTIC ARRANGEMENTS.

4. GOS NO DOUBT AWARE THAT ANY LARGE-SCALE FINANCIAL AID

TO SERVE AS GLUE TO BUTTRESS NEW RED SEA ARRANGEMENTS (INCLUDING MORE SUPPORT FOR ERITREAN GUERRILLAS TO ASSURE EHTIOPIA CEASES BE RED SEA STATE) WILL HAVE TO COME FROM SAUDI ARABIA. HOWEVER, WE HAVE OURSELVES ALREADY HAD TENTATIVE REQUESTS FROM KEY GOS OFFICIALS FOR USG SUPPORT OF NIMEIRI'S EFFORTS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE ARMS AID, AND I ASSUME KHALID (WHO REGARDED BY SOME HERE AS CONDUIT TO CIA AND SO STIGMATIZED BY CURRENT SUDANESE EXILE ATTACKS OVER ADDIS RADIO) WILL WISH PROBE FURTHER ON THIS POINT DURING HIS COMING VISIT.

5. IN CONSIDERING USG STANCE, IT WORTH NOTING GOS HAS BEEN ACTING TO SOME EXTENT AT VARIANCE WITH OUR MORE CONSERVATIVE  
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ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE SOVIET INTENTIONS AND MAY THUS HAVE PLAYED ROLE IN INCREASING REGIONAL TENSION (E.G. IN ADDIS) EVEN WHILE SEEKING COPE WITH NEW SITUATION. ANY EVIDENCE SPECIAL USG SUPPORT WOULD THUS APPEAR UNWARRANTED AND UNNECESSARY WHILE IT COULD HAVE ADVERSE EFFECT OF POLARIZING AREA SITUATION EVEN FURTHER. THIS PROCESS ALREADY WELL UNDER WAY, WITH MODERATE ARABS AND CHINESE UNDERLINING THEIR SUPPORT FOR NIMEIRI REGIME (HE HAS BEEN INVITED VISIT PEKING, PROBABLY IN JUNE), WHILE LIBYANS, SOVIETS, DR. CASTRO AND ISRAEL ALL IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER SUPPORTING EPMG. ISRAELI CONCERN RE POSSIBLE IMPACT NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON FREE TRANSIT RED SEA IS OF COURSE UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT BASIC INSPIRATION BEHIND MODERATE ARAB ACTIONS IN THIS REGION HAS NOT BEEN ANTI-ISRAEL BUT ANTI-SOVIET. OVER-REACTION ON PART ISRAELIS MIGHT WELL MODIFY THIS APPROACH.

6. HAVING ACTED SO FAR WITHOUT USG ENCOURAGEMENT, GOS WILL NO DOUBT CONTINUE TO DO SO WITHOUT SPECIAL SUPPORT FROM US. HOWEVER QUIETLY DONE, ANY SUCH SUPPORT COULD BE EXPECTED SURFACE IN DUE COURSE, THUS UNDERMINING SUDAN'S STATUS AS MODERATE NON-ALIGNED STATE WHICH IT IS NOT BELIEVED IN OUR INTEREST TO DO. TO EXTENT CURRENT SUDANESE AND OTHER MODERATE ARAB EFFORTS IN SOUTHERN ARABIA/HORN FURTHER USG OBJECTIVES, THERE APPEARS NO NEED FOR SPECIAL USG STIMULUS. MOREOVER, IT IS OF COURSE CLEAR THAT PROSPECTIVE 'RED SEA SECURITY' CONFERENCE CANNOT ESTABLISH MEANINGFUL REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM. IT IS RATHER A CODE PHRASE FOR EFFORT REDUCE SOVIET INFLUENCE AND FACILITATE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT, MOSLEM ERITREA (NIMEIRI HAS PUBLICLY LAUDED TAIZ MEETING AS OPPORTUNITY CONSULT QUOTE WITH BROTHERS WHO HAVE CLOSE RELIGIOUS TIES UNQUOTE). WE EXPECT ARAB SUPPORT TO ELF AND EDU TO INTENSIFY (KHALID HIMSELF SPOKE IN FEBRUARY OF PLANNING FOR EDU COUP DE MAIN IN ADDIS). WOULD ACCORDINGLY RECOMMEND ANY REQUESTS FROM FONMIN KHALID FOR SPECIFIC SUPPORT, EITHER UNDER RUBRIC RED SEA SECURITY OR 'SELF-DETERMINATION' FOR ERITREANS, BE TREATED WITH THE GREATEST RESERVE.

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7.. EQUALLY, HOWEVER, IT WOULD NOT APPEAR IN OUR INTEREST TO ACT IN OPPOSITION TO COURSE ON WHICH OUR MODERATE ARAB FRIENDS HAVE EMBARKED. THUS, I WOULD HOPE CURRENT WASHINGTON REVIEW WILL CONCLUDE THAT FURTHER AMMO OR SIMILAR SALES LETHAL ITEMS TO EPMG SHOULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN WHILE MAJOR INTERNAL INSURGENCY IN COURSE IN ERITREA. REALIZE KENYANS LOOK TO ETHIOPIA FOR SOME OFF-SETTING SUPPORT AGAINST SOMALI CLAIMS, BUT OUR REFUSAL CONTINUE SALES WOULD HARDLY REDUCE ETHIOPIAN/SOMALI ANTIPATHY. MIGHT BE SOME POINT IN CONSIDERING CONTINUED SALES IF EPMG WERE TO AGREE TO, AND HAD BEGUN, SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH ERITREANS WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS, BUT FROM HERE THERE SEEMS NO CHANCE OF THIS.

8. IN ADDITION, TO TAKE SOME ACCOUNT MORE ACTIVE AND MODERATE GOS REGIONAL ROLE, WITHOUT MANIFESTING SUPPORT FOR CONTROVERSIAL POLICIES OF NIMEIRI REGIME IN HORN/RED SEA, I RECOMMEND: (A) APPROVAL GOS REQUEST PURCHASE SIX C-130S; AND (B) ACCELERATED RESUMPTION OF OUR AID PROGRAM HERE WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON SIGNIFICANT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ON GROUND BY END FY77 OR AT LATEST END CALENDAR 77. POINT (A) IS, OF COURSE, DEPENDENT ON OUTCOME CURRENT WASHINGTON REVIEW. AS TO ACCELERATED AID RESUMPTION, I AM WELL AWARE VARIETY AID/W AND CONGRESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS WHICH MAKE THIS UNLIKELY, BUT THERE ARE, AFTER ALL, OUR OWN REGULATIONS AND PRESUMABLY CAN BE MODIFIED OR TELESKOPED IF WE WISH. RECENT DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT IN USG/GOS RELATIONS WOULD PROVIDE CLEAR POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION. WILL BE HARD MAINTAIN COMPARABLE MOMENTUM IN FUTURE ON THIS ASPECT OUR RELATIONSHIP IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY UNDER ROUTINE PROCEDURES, SIGNIFICANT PROJECT AID NOT RPT NOT OBLIGATED UNTIL FY79 RPT 79.

8. IN EVENT SOMETHING MORE DRAMATIC THAN FOREGOING IS DEEMED DESIRABLE, BELIEVE BEST FOCUS WOULD BE ON EARLY DEVELOPMENT SIGNIFICANT NEW SUDANESE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT PURPOSES. WITH OVER 200 MILLION ACRES OF UNUSED ARABLE  
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LAND, NINETY PERCENT RAIN-FED, THERE CLEARLY EXISTS HERE UNIQUE POTENTIAL FOR HELPING COPE WITH MAJOR WORLD FOOD SHORTAGE FORECAST FOR MID-1980S. SUCH HELP WOULD STRENGTHEN COUNTRY'S ECONOMY AND THUS INTERNAL POSITION NIMEIRI REGIME, BUT WOULD NOT INVOLVE US DIRECTLY IN CURRENT ARAB DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO ERODE OR CONFINE SOVIET PRESENCE IN HORN REGION WHICH LIKELY BE MORE SUCCESSFUL IF USG PROFILE REMAINS LOW. MOREOVER, ANY SUCH POLICY WOULD BE DIRECTING USG ATTENTION TO NIMEIRI'S ACHILLES HEEL (I.E. HIS OWN UNCERTAIN DOMESTIC SUPPORT DUE LACK-LUSTER ECONOMIC INDICATORS) RATHER THAN TO SOMEWHAT CHIMERICAL ISSUE OF RED SEA SECURITY WITH ALL THAT IMPLIES IN BROADER CONTEST USG/USSR RELATIONS.  
BREWER.

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER.

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## Message Attributes

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